US Military Operations in Venezuela and Thereafter

In the early hours of January 3, 2026, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were captured by a brilliant US Delta Force raid in Caracas. They were subsequently transported to the mainland USA and taken into federal custody. This was a classic textbook Special Forces operation - executed through enviable US military professional excellence, featuring lightning speed and surgical precision. The country is likely to be run according to US guidelines through the existing government until it transitions to a new régime. This was not a complete regime change operation, since the other members of the Maduro power structure remain intact. Vice President Delcy Rodriguez is slated to continue as the new President of Venezuela and recently expressed willingness to work with the US Administration. President Donald Trump stated that “only time will tell” how long US will call the shots in Venezuela. US further indicated that it will control Venezuelan oil sales indefinitely. According to Robert Pape, Professor at the University of Chicago’s Political Science Department and Director of the Chicago Project on Security Threats, Venezuela is perfect terrain for insurgency and primed for violent resistance. Any follow-on military operation or prolonged ad-hoc administrative arrangement may not be a happy ending. In fact, Venezuela now possibly needs comprehensive, pragmatic and a favourable political end state and consolidation to avoid resultant potential global fall-outs.

Venezuela holds world’s largest proven oil reserve, may other precious minerals and Rare Earth Materials (REM). More so, both China and Russia are expanding economic and strategic footprint in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, considering the existing and anticipating a fast changing multi-polar world order, the US appears to be seeking the revival of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine to address the evolving phenomena. The two centuries’ old doctrine’s 2025 version is much pronounced as “Donroe Doctrine”. This calls for enhanced US strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere.

China used to buy 60-90% of Venezuelan and 85-90% of Iranian crude oil. This make up about 30-35% of China’s total oil imports. It buys another 35% from several Arab suppliers. After Maduro’s arrest, oil supplies for China from Venezuela got uncertain, despite most of the Maduro Era officials remaining in the government. However, with the US exercising complete control over Venezuelan energy infrastructure, China’s prospect for Venezuelan oil may be shelved for the time being.

Earlier, President Trump warned that if Iran violently kills its protesters, the U.S. will respond. The recent protests in Iran driven by economic collapse and public discontent have turned into one indicating prospective regime collapse. Even though protests have largely subsided and Trump claimed to have convinced himself to not strike Iran, it was reportedly the KSA, Qatar, Oman and Israel who expressed concerns over U.S. plans. Trump’s recent statement, on the other hand, shows potential of revival of earlier interests. However, application of Venezuelan operational templates for an Iranian regime removal may prove different, where politico-strategic ambition may outrun strategic reality. The failed Operation Eagle Claw of 1980, meant to rescue 54 American diplomats and family members kept hostage in Tehran may bear testament to this assertion. A similar mode of operation in Latin America may be roughly executable, with yet uncertain consequences.

In a US-Iran Conflict scenario, supply of Iranian oil to outside world (including China) will become uncertain. With Venezuelan and Iranian oil supply getting stopped, the remaining 35% of oil supply to China will remain subject to U.S. pressure or influence. Such a situation will most likely force China to alternately lean towards Russia for energy supply - in addition to the already existing Power of Siberia gas pipeline deal. Currently, China imports 17.5-20% of Russian oil. If China leans towards Russia as its Venezuelan/Iranian major energy alternative, this will further solidify existing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, specially, considering a Chinese operation in Taiwan Theater. The ongoing Russian assistance to China for a Taiwan focused airborne operation is a related example.

For Venezuela, and also in the aftermath of a potential future regime collapse in Iran, major dismemberment of the existing administration, security and military apparatus like the post-2003 de-Ba’athification of Iraq and deployment of any non-local “Stabilisation Force” may be counterproductive. Such efforts may lead to the rise of extremism (like the Muqtada Al Sadr’s Mahdi Army/ISIS in Iraq), domestic insurgency and a possible rapid, protracted and major US military involvement. Such movements would be invariably fueled by anti-US camps like China and Russia, in the long run.  These will in turn lead to major drawdown of US military resources from the Indo Pacific Region (IPR) and Mainland Europe. These will further result in strategic vacuum in those theaters, facilitate potential Chinese military actions in the IPR and embolden Russian military stances in Europe - much to the dismay of the US, the European NATO members and, Ukraine.

U.S.’s military action in Venezuela has altered the country’s political landscape and may bring about conditions favorable for the US. However, it may be inappropriate to treat Venezuelan template as “replicable” virtually in all other parts of the world without considering respective domestic contextual imperatives. Given the current scenario, a yearning for a Venezuela like contingency for every global scenario may demand reassessment not only in terms of success and failure, but in the perspective of geostrategic rebalancing and resultant, yet unfathomable strategic fallouts and realignments.