Russian Assistance to China for Taiwan Invasion and Strategic Implications
- infinidea2024
- Jan 8
- 3 min read
Updated: Jan 12
Russia and China are apparently heading towards ever-deepening relationship of mutual interest. Recent leaked secret documents attained by the Black Moon hacktivist group reveal alleged Russian arming and training of Chinese forces for potential Taiwan operations. The 800-page classified document is authenticated by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
According to the documents, Russia is to supply China with necessary military equipment to arm and train a complete Chinese airborne battalion. The equipment include 37 BMD-4M amphibious assault vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 anti-tank guns, 11 BTR-MDM armored personnel carriers, command vehicles, drone systems, and specialized parachute equipment. Russia is rendering lessons from its combat experience in airborne operations, where China reportedly historically lagged behind. The agreements specify a comprehensive training program spanning both Russia and China. The agreement further includes the technology transfer and the establishment of a technical maintenance and repair center of Russian equipment in China. This allows China to undertake future production and upgradation of acquired capabilities and ensures permanent independence from Russian supply chains.
According to Military analysts, Taiwan's geography and its limited suitable beaches for amphibious landings coupled with a population of 23 million, altogether may offer airborne operations an attractive alternative for China. Russia is also equipping and training Chinese Special Forces groups to conduct operations in the region, in addition to Taiwan.
To conduct such air borne operations using the afore mentioned Russian supplied equipment, the Chinese Airforce (PLAAF) would require around 35 Il-76 transport aircrafts. Interestingly, the PLAAF is already known to operate 26 such aircrafts.
Despite a much-hyped potential Chinese operational timeline against Taiwan of 2027, an alternatively anticipated timeline remains within 2028-29 for varied reasons (Recently US President Donald Trump commented that he was assured, that Xi will not attack while Trump remains in office (next US Presidential Elections scheduled in November 2028). The ongoing Sino-Russian military cooperation is logically supposed to take upto that long to prepare the Chinese forces for the operation.
The airborne operations capabilities may enable Chinese forces PLA to operate beyond Taiwan, securing airfields or other infrastructure that could otherwise support US operations to counter the PLA amphibious landings on Taiwan. In short, an expanded air maneuver capability gives the PLA a diversity of options for rapid power projection.
Historically, Russia remained reserve of sharing its specialized military-technical skills and technical expertise to China. Even according to a Newsweek article of June 09, 2025 and many similar assertions, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s highly displayed warmth to Chinese President Xi Zinping, he fears Beijing is "trying to encroach" on Russian territory – specially, Russian Far East, including the Vladivostok Area.
Picture Courtesy: Wikipedia
However, despite such deep-rooted brewing problems, there may be following reasons for Russian reversal of decisions regarding its airborne operation cooperation:
Russia may have been bound by obligations to China to provide such military-technical assistance in return to various Chinese military and diplomatic support for Russian operations in Ukraine and purchase of Russian oil by China.
By supplying critical military capabilities and enabling local production, Russia aims to foster deeper strategic and defense collaboration and align both nations' interests against Western influence in Asia.
Chinese operation against Taiwan would draw away significant US resources from European Mainland. This would weaken the NATO European partner countries, allow ease of Russian operations in Ukraine and further facilitate potential future large scale Russian operations in Europe.
Chinese involvement in the Taiwan operations would lead to greater Indo-Pacific Regional (IPR) conflict. This would tie down and significantly attrite Chinese military and resources. This would automatically diminish prospect of Chinese military incursions in Russian Far East.
For continuation of its operations against the US and its allies in the IPR, China will become growingly dependent on Russian energy purchase and certain critical Russian military capabilities.
Russian assistance to China for Taiwan invasion would be a welcome gift for India. A Chinese invasion would reduce Chinese force posture in border areas along Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh, Tibet and elsewhere and relieve pressure on India. This would further allow Indian dominance in South Asian region. More so, a Sino-Taiwanese-US conflict would result in greater US reliance on India. As added bonus, such a conflict would further increase demand of Indian military hardware to South-East Asian countries – already marked by Filipino purchase of Indian BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. An Indonesian BrahMos deal is also strongly rumored.
An invasion of Taiwan remains extremely costly for China. The ultimate Chinese decision to invade Taiwan with Russian equipment remains uncertain and subject to broader geopolitical developments. However, such capability remains a critical force-multiplier capability for China, which may be utilized as and when necessary, against a varied and even unexpected list of targets in the IPR.
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