Was There Really a Coup Attempt in Beijing?
- infinidea2024
- 2 days ago
- 4 min read
______ McGyver
On January 24, China's Ministry of Defence announced of investigation regarding General Zhang Youxia (China's senior most general and the figure second only to President Xi Jinping in the China's top military decision-making body), Central Military Comission (CMC), the Chinese Communist Party body that controls China’s armed forces. The 75-year-old General was due to retire in 2022, but Xi kept him on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the military’s top leadership body, for a third term, substantiating Xi’s confidence on him. Another CMC member Gen. Liu Zhenli, heading the military’s Joint Staff Department, is also allegedly under investigation. A further 17 Generals were also alleged to have been sacked/apprehended.
The allegations mentioned against the officers were dubbed as “serious violations of party discipline and law”— usual official acronym for corruption. Western press account even says that Zhang leaked nuclear secrets to the US. It is further alleged that several dozen Generals, weapons manufacturing company executives were removed in President Xi Jinping’s drive against corruption and disloyalty over past three years or more. With the two Generals effectively out, the Central Military Commission has just two members left: Chairman, Mr. Xi, and General Zhang Shengmin. According to the New York Times,
Rumours of a coup and a counter-coup, by Xi Jinping’s faction against rival power blocs inside the CCP leadership are also claimed by many unconfirmed sources. Adding fuel to anticipatory popular craze and hot-cake stories, a Ukrainian Major General named Vladyslav Klochkov further went into claiming that Chinese security forces were deployed in large numbers to Beijing, and Interior Ministry Special Forces took control of the renowned Forbidden City, the historical center of Chinese capital and the residence of ancient emperors against any anti-government powerplay. However, no credible validation is available.
General Zhang’s investigation is the most drastic step so far in President Xi’s campaign over last several years to eradicate corruption and disloyalty within the PLA senior officer corps. Some analysts speculated that General Zhang’s time in the General Armaments Department (which, because of its controls over arms contracts, became known as a honey pot of corruption) also may have contributed to Zhang’s downfall.
General Zhang is accused of corruption, possible disloyalty to Xi and even leaking nuclear weapons secrets to the U.S. Zhang’s 2012 visit to USA might have been linked with this nuclear-secret leaking allegation.
According to Drew Thompson, (Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore), in October 2023, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reporter Minnie Chan disappeared from the Xiangshan Forum, Beijing.
Mr. Drew Thompson was allegedly in contact with Minnie Chan during that period and exchanged WhatsApp messages.
Minnie Chan was researching rumors about investigation on Generals Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin at that time. That means, investigations against corruption, disloaylty or discipline cases were ongoing against the officers from then onwards.
According to many, the real issue surrounding Zhang’s may not have been corruption or incompetent leadership. There are likelihoods that, given largely anticipated lack of PLA preparedness to wage a modern high intensity combat (as yet – despite induction of enormous highly sophisticated hardware), Zhang being a seasoned soldier might have objected operation in the Taiwan Strait by 2027. Apart from corruption charges, this might have been considered a sign of disloyalty and challenge to the authority.
The prevalent situation in Beijing may indicate the following:
First, there may be serious corruption within the ranks of PLA, which remains a serious concern to President Xi regarding his ambition to prepare PLA for a Taiwan Strait confrontation in near future. By ditching Zhang and others, Xi may be trying to make a corruption free, professional and operationally ready PLA.
Second, there may be serious brewing tensions between the first and second most powerful institutions in the Chinese communist system: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA.
The ultimate situations that may emerge are as follows:
Scenario 1: Short-term Setback, Long-term Advantage: With actual corruption eradication, and competent replacements of hierarchy, the PLA could emerge with solid and stronger posture after a 2-3 year restructuring period. For this, President Xi will need to find officers who combine political trustworthiness with professional excellence — a true difficult combination.
Scenario 2: Permanent Degradation: With political loyalty being the principal benchmark for replacing true soldiering and professionalism, the PLA may descent into abyss, despite continued induction of advanced hardware. This may replicate the old Soviet military: imposing on paper, ineffective in real war scenario.
Scenario 3: Factional Feud: Existing hierarchy like General Zhang Shengmin or rapidly elevated officers may restart factional feuds and complicate future of PLA.
Scenario 4: Military Coup: A 1991 Soviet-style or recent Prigozhin/Wagner style coup attempt may still remain possible, despite apparent improbability. If there actually was a coup this time against President Xi Zinping, more may still follow. The system may have to undergo turbulent period for the time being. Another potential development may be inert resistance through bureaucratic sluggishness rather than dramatic revolt.
The aforementioned situation in China may have following impacts:
Situation-1: Due to the current absence of an experienced, firm and capable senior officer cadre, Xi’s desired Taiwan Operation may be delayed for the time being.
Situation-2: With the current little turbulent state of affairs in China, Xi may seek even closer intimacy with Russia, North Korea (DPRK) and also Iran. This will further solidify their existing bondage and even in a not-so-distant-future lead to a loose/compact definitive security alliance among the states. As such, fuelling of flame inside China may be dangerously counter-productive for any initiators, otherwise opposing an assertive China.
Situation-3: With a weaker China, a resultant power vacuum may lead to the rise of numerous regional/international actors, seeking to flex muscle. This would seriously distabilise existing power equilibrium and lead to even more instability.
Situation-4: The purges’ impact on PLA effectiveness may affect multiple dimensions: command consistency, defence acquisition systems, institutional memory, and the quality of strategic decision-making.