Squad: Mushrooming Mini-Laterals in The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR)

infinidea2024
Apr 4
4 min read

Updated: Apr 12

 _________Tasnia Tasnim Hossain

Minilateralism may be defined as voluntary, non-binding, consensus-based informal and more targeted issue-specific partnerships among nations with shared interests and security concerns. Designed to temporarily address any specific threat, contingency or security issues, such collaborations may encompass numerous fields of international cooperation like security, climate change, economy, trade, connectivity, terrorism, natural disasters and other humanitarian aspects. Despite the participants’ urge to shape policies and actions, Minilaterals often lack effective implementation mechanisms.

The IPR remains the epicenter of the 21st Century global security scenario and a critical flashpoint for potential regional and geopolitical flare-ups. Growing Chinese naval and air assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Seas (ECS) long remains a major concern for major regional and extra-regional stakeholders. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) conceived countries/ IPR regional elements like the ASEAN, AUKUS, QUAD and India to be important tools for implementation of the IPS strategy, vis-à-vis, counter China. However, amid varied national priorities, interests and practicalities taking occasional precedence, the desired outcome of the IPS largely remained poorly executed/ unexecuted.

The QUAD, a vital IPS tool is growingly pronounced by many to be more of a symptom of conceived obligation, than a solution. QUAD member India with its historically independent and robust foreign policy traditionally maintains strong security and military relationships with Russia. With a burgeoning economy propelled by a thriving Working Age Population (WAP), it continues to mature such policy with further aspiration to be a major regional and global power. Such emboldening stance enabled it to refrain from denouncing Russian actions in Ukraine, much to the dismay of the West/ Global North. Again, despite being arch enemies, the Sino-Indian bilateral trade reached $ 84.44 billion during the Doklam stand-off in 2017. The series of Sino-Indian hostilities through the Doklam and Galwan episodes still saw the rivals exercising restraint and preferring dialogue over conflict - until now. As such, in a potential flare-up in the IPR beyond its borders, India may exercise greater strategic restraint against its northern neighbor than expected, obviating a less kinetic QUAD. Hence, possibly the forming of the parallel “SQUAD”, tagging Philippines with three other QUAD states – USA, Japan and Australia – less India, towards a central role in the broader US strategy of "integrated deterrence" in IPR. Philippine’s President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's decisive pro-US pivot and his stead-fast stance regarding Philippines' territorial claims in the SCS led to joining in SQUAD, featuring a potentially more active posture than ASEAN.

ASEAN, an important US IPS element seems to favour co-existence with China over hostilities despite common SCS issues. China presently maintains good terms with Thailand. China, Indonesia’s second largest FDI investor, contributed enormous financial and health related aids during COVID-19. China is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Malaysia and appears to cozying with the Vietnamese ruling regime. Cambodia recently hosted PLA Navy vessels in the Ream Naval Base and participated in a joint Sino-Cambodian naval drill. Laos with enormous Chinese loans, also underplays the SCS dispute within ASEAN. Myanmar, long despised by the West and with an ongoing insurgency remains largely Chinese influenced. Singapore tries more explicitly to navigate between the US and China.Brunei is the only ASEAN country reaching a consensus with China regarding the SCS rows.

China considers the SQUAD as an extended US effort to contain it. It warns of an “Ukrainization” of the Philippines by the US amid a resurrected “Great Power Game.” Ironically, Beijing also is fast becoming a major weapons supplier in ASEAN. China supplied Thailand with Tanks and APCs and is set to supply T-26T Submarines. Malaysia bought 18 frigates, while Indonesia acquired Chinese-made radars and command systems. China remains Myanmar’s largest arms supplier.

Philippines, a SQUAD member and old US ally is bounded by the 1951 US- Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty. It hosts the revived Cold-war-Era Clark Airforce Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. With an “ASEAN Common” SCS dispute resulting in increasing cat-and-mouse games with China, Philippines remains a bulwark against growing Chinese influences in the SCS. Philippines is acquiring numerous Frigates, OPVs, Landing Platform Dock (LPD)s and plans to induct submarines. Its air force acquired combat aircrafts from South Korea, attack helicopters from Turkey among others. The Army inducted Israeli light tanks and self-propelled howitzers. Among all, the Indian supplied BRAHMOS anti-ship missiles and the US deployed Typhon Missile system (with its 2500 km range Tomahawk anti-ship/ land attack cruise missile and 370 km SM-6 anti-air/ anti-surface missile) in Philippines has outreach to Chinese Mainland and can deter the Chinese PLA Navy/ Airforce from breaching the First and Second Island Chains towards the freer South Pacific. Both arch-rivals China and USA are fully aware of Philippines’ geostrategic standing. Sitting on a sea-junction, Philippines can effectively interfere with PLA Navy’s desperate dash through the SCS towards the Malacca Strait, Philippines Sea/ South Pacific and during a potential Sino-Taiwanese Crisis assist Taiwan, support the US led Allied Forces and significantly influence the outcome – a plethora of unique abilities possibly offered by no other ASEAN states. All these resulted in its admiration by the anti-Chinese players in the region, vis-à-vis, growing Chinese resentment towards it.

However, SQUAD might still fall short of substituting the QUAD due to Philippines’ national-economic limitations and, specially, ASEAN’s normative neutrality hinged on consensus and non-interference. SQUAD as a platform may at best perform as a Localized Anti-Chinese Deterrence and, Philippines - a regional operational springboard for the US and the Allies. SQUAD’s formation and Philippines’ entry into it may result into the following:

· Increased Sino-Filipino tensions.

· SQUAD’s wider role both in the SCS and ECS.

· Philippines’ entanglement in a potential Sino-Taiwanese conflict given its close proximity.

It possibly remains largely premature to dismiss the QUAD as ineffective. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi re-elected in India, the QUAD issue is likely to significantly influence Indian Foreign Policy. The IPR with its ever-evolving security scenarios might see mushrooming future QUAD/ SQUAD-like entities. Military issues aside, such alliances may potentially improve collaboration, reinforce resilience and contribute towards a secure and prosperous IPR.

What do you think of smaller countries increasingly forming and joining such Mini-laterals for their comprehensive economic-strategic enhancements?

SQUAD - MINILATERALS-2

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